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 Abstract: 
 
Split between its desire to join the EU and the necessities of 
regional security that Europe has not been able to address 
so far, Romania is facing hard choices in the years to come. 
However, the Politics section points out that it will be difficult 
to deal with these external challenges if the domestic policy-
making and administrative capacity continue to remain low 
(arguably, the lowest among candidate countries). SAR 
used the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act 
as a test case of general administrative capacity, and found 
out that Romanian public institutions function at about half 
the efficiency of their Bulgarian counterparts.  
Without good and efficient domestic institutions, even EU financial 
assistance can hardly make a difference. The issue of “absorption 
capacity” of these funds has been debated with much passion, but 
no conclusive arguments have been presented to the public so far. 
For the first time, we break the silence on this matter and show that 
the problem is significant, point out where the real institutional 
bottleneck is in administering EU assistance programs, and suggest 
remedies.  
Public opinion section shows trust in government on a slight 
decrease after a long stagnation. The current government has 
managed to cling to its electorate in the past year, but made no 
new inroads. Here you can find a synthesis of the public opinion 
in the last twelve months read through the CURS-SAR polls. 
Economy. Sidex is being restructured, but can other big SOEs 
follow in its steps? This section analyzes the results achieved at 
Sidex by the new private owners and concludes that on balance 
the picture looks good. But the peculiarities of steel industry 
make this success hard to replicate elswhere.  
Rule of law. With a tradition of state abuse and a weakened 
media, is Romania able to cope in the new security-conscious 
global environment? SAR issues a warning that freedom of 
speech and other civil rights may be under threat. Restrictive 
legislation, indebted TV channels and economic pressures on 
local newspapers reduce the scope for independent opinions. 
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S E L E C T E D  I N D I C A T O R S   
 
 Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Year 
2002 
Jan. 
2003 
Feb. 
2003 
Mar 
2003 Trend 
GDP growth 
(quarterly, 
annualized), % 
3.1 5.7 4.5  4.9    
? 
Devaluation of the 
Leu/USD, monthly 
average, % 
4.1 1.8 - 1.1 1.3 6.02 - 1.1 -0.02 0.2 
? 
Inflation, monthly 
average, % 
3.9 5.1 2 6 17.8 1.3 0.8 1.1 ? 
Interest rate (BUBOR, 
one week) % 
37.5 31.3 26.7 21.2  18 16.5  ? 
Industrial output, % 
change 
4.4 4.2 6.9 8.3 6.0 3.4   ? 
Trade deficit, FOB/CIF  
(million USD) 
759 1,003 948 1,279 3,988 218 247  
- 
Unemployment rate, 
% 
13 9.6 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.5  - 
Average net monthly 
salary, USD 
110.4 117.8 118.3 122.3 117.2 131.9 121  - 
State pensioners / 
employees 
1.01 1.011 1.013 1.02  1.06   ? 
Trust in government, % 
(The current 
Government can 
improve things) 
45 38 32  
 
 
38 
  
? 
Pessimism, % 
(Country heading in 
the wrong direction) 
51 57 62   
 
48.6   
? 
Subjective welfare, % 
(Better off than last 
year) 
11 12 11   
 
15   
? 
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1.GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 
1.1 LOW STATE CAPACITY HINDERS 
ROMANIA’S EUROPEAN ACCESSION 
 
The Copenhagen European summit of last December brought few 
novelties in the EU’s approach to Romania and Bulgaria. Based 
on the roadmap for the two countries, itself heavily drawing on 
the Commission’s strategy paper and the conclusions of the 
Brussels European Council, the final Copenhagen document 
restated the Union’s support towards the target set by the two 
countries for 2007. The roadmap offered again the list of 
checkpoints for the two countries, longer for Romania than for 
Bulgaria. As forecast in previous issues of EWR, Croatia has 
announced its application for membership and observers 
consider that its chances to catch up with Romania are high. 
Bulgaria is expected to have to wait for the two others, although 
its development cannot catch up in such a short time. Romania is 
doing better in terms of structural development (lower rate of 
poverty), but its administrative performance and adoption of the 
acquis trail further behind Bulgaria. The two countries together 
form a contrasting pair: in Romania the society is doing relatively 
well (compared to Bulgaria), but the state is below required 
levels; in Bulgaria the state is performing, making structural 
constraints on a severely underdeveloped society less visible. Its 
political problems put aside, Croatia is doing far better both in 
terms of state and in terms of society. Its entrance into the race, if 
accepted by the Commission, may increase the likelihood of a 
second wave in 2007 or 2008. But can Romania be ready by 
then? 
Negotiation chapters have been provisionally closed on the basis 
of the indicative accession date − 2007. 22 chapters have been 
provisionally closed with Bulgaria and 15 with Romania. Progress 
towards the completion of the accession negotiations will reflect 
progress in the adoption, implementation and enforcement of the 
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necessary measures in each country. The roadmap reiterates the 
worries of the strategy and country report, by stating that  ‘The 
overall capacity of the public administration to implement the 
acquis remains limited and represents a major constraint on 
Romania’s accession preparations. While certain parts of the 
administration are able to function effectively there are many 
important sectors where the weakness of the administration is a 
serious cause for concern.  These concerns extend beyond 
adoption of the acquis and also apply to the management of EC 
financial assistance.’ While credit is given to the government for 
starting to tackle the issue, the roadmap acknowledges that 
intentions, more than an actual policy is all the government has 
for now to redress its administrative capacity. 
Three main political obstacles hinder Romania's European 
accession. The first is low administrative capacity. The second is 
the absence of development /integration policies and strategies 
of implementation from both the government and the frail 
opposition parties, in other words the underdevelopment of the 
policymaking environment. The third is low legislative capacity, 
which explains to a great extent while negotiations with Romania 
are slow. Even if the current government, based on one party, 
improved somehow on the performance of the previous 
government, based on a undisciplined coalition, the level remains 
below Bulgaria’s. The indicator of this structural problem remains 
the number of emergency ordinances. Despite receiving heavy 
criticisms, the ordinances proliferate, because by-passing the 
Parliament at least in the short run is the only effective way the 
government can pass legislation.  
European integration is a difficult task for Romania to achieve by 
2007. Despite this fact, there are few signs that political parties 
understand they must put behind the violent partisanship raging 
in Romanian politics. The ungovernable Bucharest, where 
European money from credits are daily lost due to squabbles 
between councillors and the mayor (see the next article) is an 
eloquent example for how Romanian politics works, or rather how 
it does not work. The government spent about three months 
discussing early elections, but neither early nor regular elections 
are likely to change this pattern in which competition for state 
capture is everything, while policy and public interest are lost on 
the way. Unsurprisingly, less than 10% of Romanians trust any 
political party (those who do turn out to be the supporters of 
radical parties), 75% do not feel close to the ideology of any 
party and almost 80% believe their representatives in the 
Parliament do not do anything for the public interest2. And, 
indeed, the Parliament is not part in most relevant policy 
                                                                          
2 CURS data, October 2002 poll commissioned by SAR. 
Still low 
administrative 
and legislative 
capacity 
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decisions, being busy to rubber-stamp retrospectively the 
government ordinances. Governments have repeatedly claimed, 
with good reason, that abuse of ordinances is due to the low 
effectiveness of the Parliament (unlike ordinary laws, ordinances 
become effective immediately, even if the Parliament can 
modify them later in the process). Despite pledges to make the 
Parliament more effective, the two chambers and most MPs are 
often in the position to make simple figuration. Moreover, due to 
their large numbers, they do not interact often enough with the 
representatives of the international community, to which only a 
small number of leaders get access. This further prevents them 
from finding opportunities to upgrade their capacity. Together, 
these three problems generate a weak state syndrome − an 
inability to manifest political will from one reason or another3.  
The indicator for low legislative capacity is the number of acquis 
acts passed through Parliament, compared to the same numbers 
in Central European countries. The indicator for low policy 
capacity is the small number of policy materials produced to 
promote integration, which is not going to happen only as a by-
pass effect of adopting legislation. Neither the government, nor 
the opposition parties have created substantial policy materials in 
this respect, despite the large number of laws and amendments 
produced in total disregard of the limited implementation 
capacity. What are the indicators of the Romanian administrative 
capacity, the one of three, which seems to carry all the blame 
and actually how low is it?  
Every PHARE program officer has his or her own answer, 
depending on how the specific program worked.  Assessing 
implementation of a policy, so more than just of a program (the 
equivalent of measuring the impact of the program) is seldom 
carried out. In some instances, programs fail from stage one due 
to the inability to spend funds. In other cases specific programs 
are avoided and money lost because the administration thinks it 
has more to lose than gain assuming the tasks. Therefore, getting 
to the final stage − assessing the outcome effects of the program 
on society − is quite exceptional. However, the final stage of the 
accession process requires more than formal adoption of acquis, 
assuming this can be eventually achieved. It requires 
implementation of EU legislation. Put bluntly, this means that 
besides adopting regulations that the cans must be trashed in the 
can bin and the paper in the paper bin, the government must be 
able to enforce it, and the Romanians actually start showing 
some discipline in disposing their garbage. How far away is 
Romania still from that ideal? 
                                                                          
3  The definition belongs to Wladimir Gligorov.  
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T ,  R O M A N I A  
−  M A Y  2 0 0 3  −  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
The case of FOIA 
To measure administrative performance, SAR used a case study. It 
took one piece of legislation passed in 2001, whose 
implementation starting with 2002 has made the object of a 
government specific implementation act outlining instructions 
(norme), which was widely disseminated. Unlike other pieces of 
legislation, this law (Freedom of Information Act) has also 
received public attention and free publicity from the media, as 
well as many trainings for government officials from the part of 
the donor community. Conditions are therefore met to make it as 
a relevant case study: one year after, was the law actually 
implemented and the targets the government has set for itself 
met? 
SAR’s methodology consisted in a survey of 500 public institutions 
from 96 localities, of which 40 county capitals. A questionnaire 
was applied by SAR’s operators checking how the main 
requirements of the law were fulfilled in the legal timeframe. 
Operators were also asked to check, whenever possible, the 
statements of their respondents from various public agencies. All 
county capitals and a significant number of villages and medium-
size towns were included, as well as relevant public agencies (Fig. 
1).  
The first round of questions checked on the formal implementation of 
the law. More specifically, FOIA asked that access to public 
information by public authorities should be granted upon request or 
ex-officio, through the specially designated office or civil servant 
(article 3) and public institutions must establish specialized offices with 
the competence to inform the public and answer to the public’s 
requests for information (art 4).  
Fig. 1. Public institutions surveyed 
 No. 
Local governments 85 
Parliament  
Ministries 15 
Prefectures 40 
Higher courts 33 
Lower courts 42 
Public prosecutor offices 46 
School districts 41 
Police precincts 55 
County councils 49 
Local labor offices 59 
Other institutions 32 
Total 500 
 
Implementing 
FOIA is a test of  
capacity of the 
public sector 
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Fig. 2. Formal compliance by law provision and size of locality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results point to the ordinary formal compliance: three quarters of 
the sample designated a person in charge of fulfilling the law’s 
requirements, and over two thirds even created a special office 
to deal with FOIA (Fig. 2).  Implementation is, unsurprisingly, 
considerably lower in rural than urban areas, The level drops 
already at the level of cities below 100 000 to drop seriously at the 
commune and village level.  
Going more in depth,  article 5 requires in its turn that „each 
institution must produce and made available ex officio the 
following list of documents of public interest: 
a) The basic laws and regulations governing the institution 
b) The organizational chart, contact details of the main 
departments, office hours and appointment hours 
c) The name and contact details of the FOIA officers 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
>200.000 200.000-
100.000 
100.000-
30.000 
< 30.000 village
size of locality
Office
Officer
68
74.6
30.4
22.8
1.6
2.6
0 20 40 60 80
Is there a FOIA
office in your
institution?
Was the FOIA
officer appointed?
%
Yes No NA
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d) The budget and the main financial reports 
e) The programs and strategies of the institution 
g) The list of the documents of public interest 
h) The list of documents produced and / or administered by the 
institution 
i) The procedure that should be followed by the public for 
administrative complaints, appeal and judicial action against 
the public institution 
SAR asked respondents on the existence of such a list. Results are 
outlined in Fig. 3 below, and show that the list was declared 
ready in a much smaller number of institutions, namely a third of 
the total. The existence of the list is crucial to orient citizens, NGOs 
and the media on the kind of information, which is produced by 
the agency. It is also important in the justice, if the case ends up 
in a tribunal, as the law allows. In one of the first FOIA legal cases, 
a state agency responsible for monitoring drinking water quality 
denied its respective quality in front of the judge and in the 
absence of any documents the case was lost by the plaintiff, a 
former employee denying the agency knowingly allowed the 
water to stay above the admissible pollution level. Furthermore, 
the figure represents only the number of self-reports stating that 
the list was compiled. 
Fig. 3. Self-reports on producing the list of public documents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, when operators asked to see the list themselves, only 
16% of agencies could produce one. Our operators did not check 
if the list was accurate and complete. The essential fact is that 
16% only were able to meet the minimal first requirement of 
freedom of information act: making the inventory of public 
information which can be disclosed to the public. What did the 
large numbers of FOIA officers do all along remains a mystery. 
They were not too busy with handling requests, as only 22% 
agencies have received official requests for information based on 
FOIA in the first year of implementation. How can these even be 
handled if the list is not available to the public? Eight agencies 
Only 16% of the 
Romanian public 
institutions 
against 48% in 
Bulgaria proved 
able 
to implement 
FOIA in the first 
year 
No
46%
NA
20%
Yes
34%
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have been sued on the basis of FOIA so far, and 23 have 
received administrative complaints that requests for information 
were unsatisfactorily handled.  
One year after FOIA was enacted the evidence does therefore 
show that it was implemented formally and superficially in 2/3 of 
the agencies surveyed, but the first substantial step was 
undertaken in only 16% of the public administration, compared to 
48% in Bulgaria in the first year after their FOIA was enacted4. The 
case is illustrative for the fate of the acquis, which even after 
going passing the obstacle of Parliament is awaited by a similar 
outcome. The government department in charge with Freedom 
of Information Act, the Department of Information, has invested a 
lot of its public credit on this bill, as well as a substantial budget to 
buy advertising space and commission an unconvincing 
awareness campaign. Even when efforts are made, the results 
match the above model: less than fifth of a total are near the 
level of implementation required.  
The roadmap of the European Commission makes some 
substantial recommendations to the Romanian government 
(page 25): to devise mechanisms to increase accountability and 
political independence of civil servants, to introduce human 
resources management, increase training, develop further 
legislation of civil servants, and so forth. All these seem more like 
targets than recommendations to those acquainted with the 
situation on ground. It is not by mere chance that Romania has 
the highest corruption score from all applicant countries with 
Transparency International, and the worse governance score with 
Freedom House-Nations in Transit. Nothing will prevent further 
legislation of being as disregarded as the current one is, and 
training for civil servants and politicians as superfluous as it has 
been in the past decade, if promotion in the state and local 
bureaucracy continues to have no connection with merit 
whatsoever, and performance, rather than loyalty, is not 
rewarded. Although Romania is a laggard in the process of EU 
integration, one should try hard to find one instance of public 
manager fired for not achieving the targets. Modern HR 
management presupposes a modern bureaucracy, not one ruled 
by particularism and patrimonialism. A policy to go beyond the 
weak state syndrome and affect substantially the implementation 
capacity of the government is almost impossible as long as the 
will itself to implement such a policy has yet to be mobilized.  
                                                                          
4 Access to Information Program, 2002. The current Situation of the Access to 
Public Information in Bulgaria. AIP: Sofia. 
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GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
 
• Revise both general labor legislation and specific civil servants law 
to allow for a competitive civil service, with promotion and salarization 
based on targets achieved (incentives) and permanent work contracts 
granted only after a number of targets are achieved (penalties). The 
Labor Code just adopted sets a poor framework for a flexible labor 
legislation, based on competition and achievement, not survival. 
• Set performance targets, strictly correlated with the budget and 
wages, in each public agency, central government included. 
• Create a watchdog of the government to enforce performance and 
ethics in the same time, whose evaluation in granting tenure or 
dismissing civil servants should be of crucial importance. 
• Make periodical public evaluations of agencies and executives who 
perform and those who do not: continuing with the uniform (or erratic) 
treatment discourages performance. 
• Make computer literacy and good knowledge of English mandatory 
for all the new positions in the civil sector. 
• Advertise in the media the openings in the civil service and positions 
available in European assistance programs. The fact that such positions 
are seldom advertised feeds the public's distrust in the administration 
and gives the impression that European funds are only feeding rent-
seekers. 
• Dismiss at least once in a while top executives who perform poorly. 
Dismissals only on political reasons (more often than not because a 
person with political support wants to replace a civil servant with less or 
no political support) are counterproductive for administrative 
performance. 
• Place clients who cannot be refused in positions where 
performance matters less, and do professional recruiting for jobs that 
really matter in the integration process. Protect from clients the few 
good people you manage to get: at the end of the day, they are the 
ones ensuring everybody’s pay. 
• When you can identify the few who deliver, promote them and 
empower them to manage larger sectors. At this level the expertize is 
very scarce, and turnout in civil service high, because people have 
many other opportunities in the private sector. 
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1.2 BOTTLENECKS OF EU FUNDS 
 
Romania’s low administrative capacity shows most dramatically in 
the key area of absorbing donor funds in general, and EU funds in 
particular. On a regular basis, officials from the European 
Commission publicly declare that the Romanian bureaucracy is 
unable to absorb the large sums of money which are made 
available each year. More funds were pledged by the EU for 
Romania and Bulgaria to help them catch up after Copenhagen, 
but in order for these funds to achieve their task current 
bottlenecks must be investigated.  
Rather than accepting the criticism from Brussels in the spirit in 
which it is given – i.e. constructive criticism aimed to increase 
Romania’s “absorption capacity” – government officials all too 
often go into defense mode and claim that we are in fact 
perfectly able to spend all the funds that Brussels makes 
available. In an interview with the EU Observer, Eneko Landaburu, 
head of the Enlargement Directorate at the European 
Commission said that Romania does not really have the 
administrative capacity to attract EU funds: "The problem lies with 
the weak administration, which will absolutely have to reform in 
order to join the EU in 2007". Also mentioned in the same interview 
was the problem of the EIB loan to Bucharest City Hall, which is 
also seen as an "absorption" problem. In response, the Ministry for 
European Integration made it clear that spending EU funds was 
not a problem for Romania and that an extra 2000 new 
bureaucrats were being employed this year in order to help 
resolve the issue.  
What neither party addressed in this exchange was the real 
problem regarding EU funds – the institutional “bottleneck” within 
the Ministry of Finance, which not only delays the spending of EU 
funds, but also makes the process extremely tortuous and 
complicated, and the atmosphere poisoned,  while the likelihood 
of “transferring know-how” (one of the aims of EU assistance) is 
lost within these bureaucratic struggles. 
The following paragraphs seek to identify the bottleneck within 
the system, describe the overall context in which these funds are 
spent, and make some practical suggestions which would help to 
improve the situation. 
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The framework and context of EU funds 
 
Although Romanians have become accustomed to the fact that 
the EU and other international donors make large cash donations 
to Romania, little effort is made to promote the ideas and 
philosophies behind these funds and some people struggle to 
understand why so much money is given to their country. 
Fortunately, the European Commission has come a long way in 
terms of communicating its policies and guidelines5, most of 
which can be seen on their mega-site: http://europa.eu.int. 
According to the Vade Mecum on grant management (1998) “A 
grant is a direct payment of a non-commercial nature by the 
Commission to promote an EU policy aim.” The overall objective 
of the PHARE programme is to “help the candidate countries 
prepare to join the European Union”. 
EU’s policy in Romania is clear: the invitation to join the EU is open 
if the Romanian Government is able and willing to adopt – and 
properly implement – the 31 chapters of the acquis 
communautaire. This principle has been accepted by all 
Romanian political parties, the process is underway and the 
public is very much in favor of joining the EU (although whether 
this is due to ignorance of EU policies is open to debate). 
In practice what the 31 chapters of the acquis represent is a 
detailed policy and road map to reform for each and every 
ministry6. This in turn means that each ministry can apply for EU 
“Structural Funds” in order to build its capacity to both manage 
the funds and adopt the new legislation. These funds generally 
end up in the hands of EU consultancy companies who provide a 
wide range of Technical Assistance and other services.  
There are several problems at the ministerial level, problems that 
the European Commission’s Delegation to Bucharest has been 
wrestling with for years: 
• A tendency towards resentment among certain ministerial 
officials, who can dismiss and undermine the efforts of EU 
consultants. This is often based on jealousy because the EU 
                                                                          
5 Despite the EU’s progress in promoting its policies and procedures, the EU 
could do a lot more in terms of informing the Romanian public about what 
the various EU funds are actually spent on. The lack of information on this 
subject, allied to news of large sums of money becoming available, can lead 
to assumptions about corrupt practices. 
6 The World Bank programme for Romania is constructed along similar lines to 
the EU funds, i.e. budgets are allocated to individual line ministries based on 
their reform efforts, capacity and coherent requests. 
 
Romanian top 
civil servants 
have no stake in 
the success of an 
EU funded 
program 
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consultant will be often getting paid hundreds times more than 
the Romanian officials. If the ministerial official is incompetent, 
he will seek to blame the consultancy for the lack of progress. 
• A lack of capacity within individual ministries to understand 
and effectively deal with the complex EU procedures. Each 
ministry is required to set up a PMU (Project Management Unit) 
and if these appointments are made on political – rather than 
professional – criteria, little progress will be made.  
• An expectation among certain PMU members that association 
with an EU project will bring personal material reward. When 
the officials realize that the consultants usually have little in the 
way of unallocated funds and many are unfamiliar with 
Romanian practices, relations can worsen. 
These factors can undermine the assumption that an experienced 
western expert will be able to transfer know-how to open minded 
and supportive Romanian officials. While this may suit the 
consultant who is usually so caught up in the approval process 
with the Ministry of Finance (see below) that he/she has little time 
for the transfer of know-how, it represents a major lost opportunity 
for the ministries who should be learning from each and every 
specialist who visits.  
The other EU policy that needs to be understood in this context is 
that of ownership. In order to build capacity and a sense of 
responsibility among candidate countries the European 
Commission introduced the DIS (Decentralized Implementation 
System). The DIS was a complex rule-book for individual ministries 
and governments to properly manage the EU funds (it has 
subsequently been updated and renamed) and was introduced 
in parallel with accession talks. At the same time, the EU 
introduced strict new spending rules, which obliged all 
procurement of goods and services to be tendered. On the 
theoretical side, both these developments were positive.  
All this placed a huge burden on the Romanian bureaucracy, not 
used to setting up management units, run by genuine experts 
willing to take personal responsibility for complex decisions. 
Romania’s institutional culture is more attuned to the command 
style of the Communist period, where initiative was crushed and 
all decisions were made by the minister. This was the first big 
“capacity crunch” that Romania faced with regard to the 
absorption of EU funds, and one that has not yet been 
satisfactorily resolved. If every paper, no matter how trivial, needs 
to be signed and countersigned up in the hierarchy, just because 
Programs 
become 
unmanageable 
because 
responsibility is 
not delegated 
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responsibility cannot be delegated to lower levels, this leads to 
significant delays in the process.  
If we jump to the present day, many of the above problems are being 
tackled, and it is clear that certain officials have made superhuman 
efforts to understand EU procedures and generally gear up the system 
to EU standards. Most ministries have set up PMUs and are managing 
EU funds from PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD.This government has made 
some important steps in improving Romania’s absorption capacity. The 
new Ministry of European Integration deserves particular credit for 
setting up training and information schemes in order to build the 
capacity of the line ministries. 
Identifying the “bottleneck” 
In order to understand the bottleneck within the system it is 
essential to understand the way in which contracts are awarded 
and where lie the ministerial responsibilities. The process by which 
a ministry – or a municipal government – can access EU funds, to 
finance particular projects, is as follows: 
• The European Commission will sign a Financial Memorandum 
with a line ministry with regard to a particular project that 
relates to a policy (e.g. For environmental policy, a project to 
improve the water supply system in Galati would qualify); 
• The Ministry responsible for water supplies will produce a Terms 
of Reference (TOR). This should be done by the PMU but if they 
are not able (as is often the case) it can be done by a 
consultant or an EC Delegation staff member; 
• The TOR becomes the basis for a public tender for Supplies, 
Services or Works, which is announced on the Commission’s 
internet site;  
• A number of (usually international) service companies – or 
consortia – are shortlisted. They submit detailed proposals and 
budgets and an evaluation committee at the Ministry of 
Finance’s CFCU (Central Finance and Contract Unit) chooses 
the most competitive offer. EC representatives can attend 
these evaluation sessions and can cancel them if they suspect 
corrupt practices; 
• A contract is signed between the company (the contractor) 
who wins the tender and the CFCU (the contracting authority). 
From the moment the contract is signed, the contractor must 
submit continual progress reports and detailed spending 
analyses to the CFCU if it wants to be paid for its services. 
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What becomes clear in the above description is the critical role of 
the Ministry of Finance’s CFCU, which is in effect the legal entity 
responsible for almost all EU projects. In addition to its 
responsibilities for the international EU contracts, the CFCU is also 
responsible for each and every sub-contract the contractors sign 
with local suppliers – as well as each and every grant contract for 
the grant funds (e.g. the 19 million Euro given in grants to Child 
Protection Institutions). This rule was set up in order to prevent 
corruption but it just creates an unmanageable mass of work for 
the CFCU, as well as excruciating delays and stress at all levels of 
the system. 
It is within the CFCU where the bottleneck in the system lies, and 
because of its obscure identity within the Ministry of Finance it 
escapes the scrutiny of the media, which is generally reserved for 
the Ministry of European Integration (where most people wrongly 
believe the "absorption capacity" problem lies). The problems 
faced by the CFCU are complex and numerous, but the main 
internal problems can be presented as follows: 
• With hundreds of contracts operating simultaneously, the 
CFCU is under much pressure regarding its financial and legal 
responsibilities. It lacks resources in general and human 
resources in particular, and is unable to effectively monitor all 
contracts. 
• Due to the institutional culture of decision making at the 
highest level, the CFCU’s problems are compounded by the 
fact that the director must personally approve almost all 
contracts and invoices. There appears to be very little 
delegation of authority and an atmosphere of mistrust 
regarding the contractors (and the EC Delegation has not 
been determined enough in discouraging this attitude). This 
factor is the “bottleneck within the bottleneck”, and getting 
the director’s approval for mundane issues can involve 
lobbying from the delegation and even Brussels.  
• Romanian officials are poorly paid and there are no 
concessions for those within the CFCU. Many of them see the 
seemingly high fees of international and local consultants. 
Such low pay, allied to such high levels of responsibility, 
inevitably leads to demotivation.  
• Despite its strategic responsibilities, and the complex nature of 
the work involved, the CFCU is run like any other Romanian 
public institution – with a consequent lack of modern 
management systems (clear lines of responsibility, incentives, 
delegation of authority, training, bonuses) which could help to 
The real 
bottleneck – 
CFCU, in the 
Ministry of 
Finance 
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more effectively manage the massive workflow. The directors 
are so swamped in mundane work that they are unable to 
consider strategic or policy decisions. 
Taking into consideration the above factors, it is a wonder that 
anything gets done at all at the CFCU and it is a testament to the 
hard work and integrity of the officials involved that they are able 
to get so many contracts through this bottleneck, and have 
remained apparently clean to date. The following factors can be 
described as external factors influencing the CFCU and these are 
equally important in understanding the problem. 
• With delays in getting approvals for most EU projects, the EC 
Delegation inevitably gets involved in pressurising the CFCU 
officials to agree to individual requests from the contracts they 
are responsible for. The effect of this informal lobbying is that 
the EU is effectively taking the initiative away from the 
government, thus undermining the EU's overall aim of creating 
a sense of ownership within the Romanian government. 
Although this is justified in terms of expediency, it does present 
a moral dilemma that needs to be addressed. 
• As a further negation of the principle of Romanian 
government ownership, the PMUs within the individual 
ministries become marginalized within this bureaucratic 
process, and the delays that occur are out of PMUs’ control. 
Although the PMUs designed the projects, and are responsible 
for approving their contractors’ progress reports (which is a 
requirement for payment) as well as local tenders, they have 
no contractual authority over the contractor and this can be a 
demotivating factor, which can result in a loss of interest in the 
project itself, and an increased likelihood of know-how not 
being passed on. 
As mentioned above, the fact that the CFCU is so well hidden 
within the Ministry of Finance (which rarely comments on EU 
issues) is one of the reasons why it has so far not come under 
press or diplomatic scrutiny. If the CFCU could be modernized in 
terms of its management capacity, and properly resourced, it 
could play a key part in not only managing EU funds better but 
ensuring that the transfer of know-how actually happens and is 
not just an idea to be sneered at by frustrated and burned out 
officials. 
The following recommendations would go some way to resolving 
the problems faced by the CFCU, which in turn would increase 
not only their own capacity but also the capacity of Romania to 
effectively absorb all the EU funds available: 
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1. The Romanian government and the European Union should 
commission an experienced management consultancy consortium 
to fully assess the needs of the CFCU. The detailed recommendations 
of this study should form the basis for a full modernization package 
that could transform the institution. 
2. Based on the recommendations, which would emerge from the 
above study, the management of the CFCU should be overhauled 
and the principle of delegation of authority – in particular – should 
be implemented. 
3. The CFCU should be fully resourced in order to effectively carry out 
its current duties, to motivate and manage its staff, and to have 
spare capacity to deal with other EU related policy issues. 
4. The diplomatic and political communities in Romania should 
recognize the CFCU for what it is: a strategic point within the 
administration that is responsible for all EU funds, and at the same 
time a bottleneck that is preventing Romania from absorbing all the 
funds and know-how that is made available to it.  
5. Once the management and resource issues are decided, the CFCU 
should develop an effective Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, as well 
as a Public Relations capacity, thus ensuring that the press, the 
diplomats and the politicians are kept informed about the progress 
being made. 
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2.PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT DECLINES  
AFTER LONG STAGNATION 
• Romanians love both US and Europe indiscriminately 
 
 
There was no NATO effect. Unlike the spectacular changes of 
landscape in the public opinion of neighbor countries after their NATO 
entry, the Romanian public opinion was rather stagnant.  The 
government party kept most of its public support after the drop 
experienced in the first part of 2002. No significant new support was 
gained, however, and the figures of trust in the main political 
institutions stayed largely the same. The government ended the year 
with a distrustful majority, but kept its hard core of supporters 
unaffected (38% compared to 36% a year ago). However, spring polls 
show discontent is again on the rise, the numbers of those considering 
the government is not able to handle the country reaching the 
absolute majority threshold (51%).7 
 
Fig. 1. The current government can improve the country situation
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7 April 2003 CURS poll. 
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Fig.2. Country heading in the wrong direction
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The majority of Romanians experienced no improvement in their 
lives. The average household income of those who report 
stagnation in their welfare is of 4.8 million ROL (130 euro) 
compared to only 2.87 million ROL (80 euro) for those who report 
being worse off.   
 
Fig.3 Subjective well being
11
38
50
12
41
47
11
33
56
14
40
45
15
43
41
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Better off than last
year
Same than last year
Worse than last year
%
Jan-02 Mar-02 Jun-02 Sep-02 Jan-03
 
 
 
 
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T ,  R O M A N I A  
−  M A Y  2 0 0 3  −  
 
 
24 
 
 
Fig. 4. Public opinion by income group 
 Mean 
(euro) 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Government is not able to 
improve situation 
128 (5,83) 
Government is able to improve 
situation 
124 (5,14) 
Don’t know 96 (3,12) 
Wrong direction 109 (5,17) 
Right direction 145 (5,59) 
Don’t know 102 (4,34) 
Source: January 2003 CURS poll 
The perception of the country headed right or wrong seems to be 
determined by one’s household economic performance. The 
perception of government’s capacity to handle things is less so – other 
factors, such as one’s ideological stand, or party preference, have a 
stronger influence here. Therefore, while an important difference in 
income separates those approving of direction from those 
disapproving of it, those doubting or endorsing the government have 
similar incomes.  The political preference of Romanians stayed largely 
the same throughout the past year. The global events had limited 
influence. Romanians approved of support for the US, while remaining 
committed for European integration. They were less anti-war than most 
European countries. 
 
Fig. 5. Top international military support against Iraq
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Trust in political institutions remains comparable with that in other 
Balkan countries: political parties and Parliament are the least trusted 
institutions. One peculiarity of Romania is the relative high level of trust 
that local governments have enjoyed starting with 1999. There is a 
clear correlation between the level of decentralization and 
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empowerment of local government, and their capacity to satisfy 
public demand, reflected in the figures of trust. The judiciary and 
the police are still facing majorities who are not appreciative of 
their performance. 
 
Fig. 6. Trust in institutions
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2002 was clearly on the average a more peaceful year from the social 
point of view than 2001: fewer strikes, less tension among the new rich 
and the poor. Overall, the level of conflict perceived by the public 
stayed the same, with high figures for social conflict and conflict with 
Roma, and the usual ones for conflict with Hungarians. The distance 
between conflicts experienced in one’s environment in the previous 
year and the overall appreciation of conflict grew in 2002: less 
experience does not modify the general perception of conflict in the 
short run. The latter is grounded in prejudice at least as solidly as in 
experience: in the case of conflict with Hungarians, where no conflict 
is reported, the high figure of ‘subjective conflict’ (42%) is clearly 
unfounded, echo of symbolic international conflicts (such as the Status 
Bill, see previous Annual EWR) and not of direct experience, which 
could not be more peaceful. Twice as many believe in social conflicts 
than those experiencing them locally, probably due to media 
exposure. While overall social and ethnic tension remains high, the 
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decrease in direct experience with local conflicts is a positive 
development. 
 
Fig. 7. Trends of subjective and experienced conflict 2002-2003 
 Subjective 
conflict 02 
Subjective 
conflict 03 
Experienced 
conflict 02 
Experienced 
conflict 03 
Employers and 
employees 
72 68 43 37 
Rich and poor 70 62 38 30 
Romanians and 
Hungarians 
43 42 4 3 
Romanians and 
Roma 
60 60 35 30 
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3.ECONOMY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE TURNAROUND OF SIDEX.  
CAN OTHERS FOLLOW? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The privatisation of SIDEX - the largest steel maker in South Eastern 
Europe - in the second half of 2001 was arguably a milestone of 
structural transformation in the Romanian economy. SIDEX was 
regarded as one of the largest “black holes” of the economy, 
becoming an ever growing burden for the state budget. The lack of a 
resolute approach on SIDEX had been thought to illustrate the 
insufficient advance of the reform process in Romania; social 
constraints, underperforming management and industry-specific 
problems added to the problem. The new owner of SIDEX, LNM ISPAT, 
a global player in the steel industry, faced the difficult task of turning 
SIDEX performances around. The year 2002 witnessed history in the 
making; SIDEX financial results appear encouraging, while the feared 
social bomb has not blown off.  
 
This paper analyzes the privatisation of SIDEX under many aspects: the 
deal itself, the determinant factors that laid behind it, its implications 
for the public budget, the evolution of SIDEX financial indicators, 
theexperience of LNM ISPAT in restructuring similar companies in 
distress in other countries. But first and foremost, we consider the SIDEX 
Case 
study 
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case in the context of other large state owned loss-making companies 
in Romania. Can the SIDEX example be replicated in other troubling 
industries? Or is it a looking-like success story, but only an isolated one?  
 
What lessons should we learn? 
 
This paper holds that the outcome of specific privatisation deals varies 
with the type of industry and the profile of investor. Metallurgical 
products are, to a large extent, fungible, and competitive advantage 
in this industry can be considerably improved through managerial 
tactics; also, the SIDEX buyer has a global bargaining power, and a 
worldwide experience in restructuring troublemaking companies. 
These conditions have not been met on many occasions before; only 
resembling industries and investors could think of repeating the SIDEX 
experience in transition economies.  
Type of industry and profile of investor 
 
Metallurgy was at the heart of earlier industrial revolutions; it is usually 
associated with a heavy-type of industry consisting of large production 
capacities, high consumption of energy, mass employment. Steel 
industry has been traditionally subject of various foreign trade barriers 
and foreign ownership limitations. However, steel products are 
commodities (products are standardized; one can choose to buy 
Romanian steel over American steel, if price is better). This particularity 
makes the steel industry global by nature; as globalization advances in 
all fields, the steel industry is being forced to admit its nature. 
Cost-effectiveness must be considered at a global scale and the 
industry can not escape the wave of consolidation (mergers and 
acquisitions) already wide-spread in global industries producing global 
products. Mergers in recent years include Krupp and Thyssen, British 
Steel and Hoogovens, Nippon Steel and Kawasaki, Usinor and Arbed, 
not to mention the appetite the LNM Group has proved for ailing mills 
worldwide; yet, the scope for further consolidation remains as the top 
ten steelmakers collectively produce only about 25% of the world’s 
crude steel production.  
The LNM Group has been buying its way to the status of global investor 
over the last two decades. The LNM Group comprises LNM Holdings, a 
family business, and Ispat International, a company listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, where LNM Holdings has an 80% stake. LNM 
Holdings includes: Ispat Nova Hut (Czech Republic), Ispat Sidex 
(Romania), Iscor Limited (South Africa), Ispat Karmet (Kazachstan), 
Ispat Annaba (Algeria), Ispat Indo (Indonesia). Ispat International 
includes: Ispat Unimetal (France), Ispat Germany, Ispat Sidbec 
(Canada), Carribean Ispat (Trinidad Tobago), Ispat Inland (USA), Ispat 
Mexicana (Mexico). According to statistics from the International Iron 
and Steel Institute, the LNM Group was the fourth largest steel 
producing company in 2000; the group currently appears to have 
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climbed even higher, closer to the ultimate ambitions expressed by its 
founder, Lakshi Mittal.  
The LNM Group’s philosophy is simple: buy distressed steelmakers, with 
a view to geographically diversify these acquisitions, and apply basic 
modern management principles and techniques to run them 
profitable. The LNM Group employs a core team of experts, moving 
them around from one location to another, to implement cost-cutting 
measures, marketing changes and market reorientation. Nothing very 
fancy, but simply effective in an industry with a long track of ill 
management, inefficient trade connections, and powerful unions.  
Results were sharp in many cases. Ispat Karmet doubled production in 
the first five years after acquisition; Ispat Mexicana increased 
production and shipment seven-fold in the first seven years from 
acquisition; Ispat Sidbec and Ispat Inland managed to reduce the cost 
per ton by 42$, respectively 82$, since acquisition; Ispat’s plant in 
Ruhrort reduced manpower costs by 25% in the first two years following 
acquisition.  
As the New York Times put it11, the LNM Group has become global “… 
by cheaply acquiring huge money-losing state-owned mills from 
governments desperate to remove them from state banks”.  The 
seller’s eagerness to sell is a major ingredient in the LNM Group’s 
success. Governments in emerging economies, or in more 
conservative states, want to escape social pressures and fiscal 
burdening; at least in the Eastern countries, some international 
financial institutions give a willing hand as well: EBRD granted a 100 
mil.USD loan for the LNM’s investments in Sidex, and a 450 mil.USD loan 
for the LNM’s investments in Karmet. The scandal that burst out in 
Britain, stressing a contribution from Mittal to Tony Blair’s campaign, 
followed by a letter signed by Blair, and addressed to the Romanian 
Prime-Minister, in support of the privatization of SIDEX, fuelled 
allegations of external political endorsement, not to say pressures, in 
favor of the SIDEX deal. It is noteworthy that the privatization of SIDEX 
marked high on the agenda of IMF and World Bank programs in 
Romania; and the privatization of Nova Hut came only weeks before 
general elections were held  in the Czech Republic. 
Coincidentally or not, another factor that might have influenced 
LNM’s decision to invest in Romania is the country, considered to 
belong to the group of developing economies, is therefore exempted 
from the 30% surcharge on steel imports imposed by US only a few 
months after the acquisition of SIDEX. The LNM Group avoids this barrier 
through its affiliates in Trinidad Tobago, Romania and Algeria, not to 
mention that it is the only global competitor to run plants in each of 
                                                                          
11 Peter Green, “Betting Big on Reviving ‘Black Holes’ ’’, New York Times, July 
7, 2002. 
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the three NAFTA countries. Mittal even says12 that the imports control 
in US are a blessing in disguise, as they stimulated consolidation in the 
industry and boosted steel prices. 
It should be said that, given the industry turmoil, SIDEX difficult financial 
position, and other competitors lack of interest for Eastern European 
mills, LNM was probably the only potential investor with a global 
exposure, willing to take over the operations of SIDEX. Usinor also 
expressed its interest, but only as management was regarded; and US 
Steel was the only American steelmaker to make an acquisition in 
Eastern Europe (Slovak Republic).   
 
The SIDEX deal 
 
LNM’s acquisition practice indicates a tendency for paying low 
amounts for the controlling stake (seeking for market power 
inducements wherever possible), and committing to invest more 
in restructuring and technological and environmental upgrading. 
SIDEX case, quite similar to that of Karmet, made no exception 
from this approach (see figure 1), as a result of LNM’s strong 
bargaining power and, correspondingly, the low bargaining 
power of the Romanian state. 
 
Fig. 1. Comparison between various recent acquisitions by LNM 
Company 
acquired 
Production 
capacity 
(million 
tonnes)/ no. 
of employees 
Price for 
controlling stake, 
mil. USD 
Total investment 
commitment, 
(incl. price paid 
outright), 
mil. USD 
4.5 Sidex 
27000 
70 500 
2.7 Nova Hut 
(Czech Rep.) 12000 
20 905 
6.3 Karmet 
(Kazakhstan) 72000 
450 800 
4.0 Mexicana 
n.a. 
25 plus 195 in 
government 
bonds 
n.a. 
Source: ispat.com, worldsteel.org, international press 
 
The final deal, as set out in the Emergency Ordinance 119 of 
September 2001 - that came to be known as the “SIDEX ordinance” -, 
provides LNM with a wide range of incentives and facilities, 
summarized below: 
                                                                          
12 According to Financial Times, February 10, 2003. 
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- a debt-equity swap, as all receivables owned by state institutions, 
companies and authorities over SIDEX were converted into shares, at 
the nominal rate of 25000 lei/share. Subsequently, these resulting 
shares were sold to LNM at a rate of 3300 lei/share. Existing minority 
shareholders at that time, two SIFs included, were not permitted to 
contribute to the corresponding increase in social capital. 
- five years exemption of customs duties and VAT for imports of 
equipment, raw materials and other products related to technological 
and environmental upgrading. 
- five years VAT exemption on domestic market acquisitions related to 
technological and environmental upgrading. 
- three years postponement of VAT payable for all other types of 
transactions. 
- three years postponement of social contributions. 
- five years profit tax exemption. 
- a series of employees’ rights are to be provided by the state in case 
of individual leaves. 
 
The debt equity swap is an usual practice in the acquisition of heavily 
indebted companies. It erases overdue debts (at a discount premium) 
and it gives the buyer the opportunity to start the operations without 
historic debts. The LNM itself obtained a similar deal on the acquisition 
of Nova Hut, all debts to the state being cancelled and a large 
banking loan being rescheduled. However, this should not make us 
disregard the fact that such global hunters, LNM included, end up 
paying almost nothing for the assets of the companies they bought. 
The Mexican company bought by Ispat is a very modern one, built up 
by the Mexican government in the 80’s for over 2.2 billion USD; Ispat 
bought it for an aggregate sum of just above 200 mil.USD.  
SIDEX total assets mounted to over 1.1 billion USD at the time of 
acquisition; yet, it is unclear how much LNM actually paid for the 
business as such (if one leaves debts aside). One might be tempted to 
submit that the total sum paid by LNM for SIDEX only covers for the 
equity derived from the debt-equity swap. Following facts, that may 
lead to such a remark, are documented from multiple sources13: 
 
- LNM paid 70 million USD to the Romanian state in exchange for 
around 90% of SIDEX, including a 70% stake hold by APAPS and an 
almost 20% stake resulted from the debt-equity swap. 
- SIDEX financial statements recorded, at the end of December 2001, 
an increase in social capital, in the form of subscribed unpaid capital, 
of an amount slightly above 70 mil.USD. This subscribed capital was 
                                                                          
13 SIDEX financial statements, LNM and Romanian Government press releases, 
APAPS reports, etc. 
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then paid, according to SIDEX financial statements as of first semester 
2002.  
- SIDEX liabilities diminished (see figure 2) by around 770 mil.USD 
between end of first semester and end of year 2001 (in this time 
interval, the “SIDEX ordinance” came into force).  If we transform this 
difference in liabilities, at a rate of 9 cents per dollar - as it is suggested 
to us by the discount rate applied in the debt-equity swap -, it results a 
sum exceeding 69 mil.USD.  
Another striking feature of the post-privatization episode, allegedly not 
comprised in the privatization deal, is that the Romanian Government, 
using RICOP resources as well, is supporting ISPAT SIDEX plan of job 
reductions (7400 employees left jobs voluntarily to take advantage of 
various compensatory schemes); monthly payments add to about 1,3 
mil.USD and are expected to last until end of 2004. 
These controversial aspects asides, one must admit that the new 
owner of SIDEX is doing well to cut costs, improve efficiency, and even 
increase production. The key elements of the restructuring program 
implemented by LNM representatives at SIDEX are14: 
- top local management was replaced by LNM Group senior 
executives; 
- put an end to the barter system. The barter system used to be the 
main source for profit for small intermediate trading firms, at the 
expense of SIDEX; the mixed department for sales and acquisitions 
functioning with SIDEX before was closed down. The 100 mil.USD loan 
from EBRD helped increasing liquidity on short term. 
- long term supply contracts were negotiated 
- a system of authorized dealers was implemented. Only authorized 
dealers were allowed to distribute SIDEX products; and each 
authorized dealer must inform SIDEX on the final destination of each 
delivery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
14 as described by senior ISPAT SIDEX executives in the article mentioned from 
the New York Times 
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Note: financial data converted at ROL/USD end period exchange rate 
Source: computed from www.rasd.ro 
 
These moves, among other restructuring efforts, led to improved 
financial indicators shortly after the acquisition (see figures 3 and 4). It 
is remarkable that turnover increased while the number of employees 
shrinked by almost one quarter. 
 
Fig. 3. Turnover, Sidex, mil USD
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Note: data for end year 2002 are annualized, based on first semester 2002.  
Financial data converted at ROL/USD period average exchange rate 
Source: computed from www.rasd.ro 
 
These results should, nevertheless, be treated with precaution, as the 
financial records of such a global corporation like LNM is a complex 
web of financial links; one should not overlook the fact that affiliate’s 
profitability is influenced by the thrive to achieve overall profitability 
and profits are sometimes recorded on purpose in those countries with 
a more favourable fiscal environment; in Romania, LNM benefits from 
numerous fiscal incentives, as described above. 
Fig. 2. Total liabilities, SIDEX, mil. USD 
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Fig. 4. Net result (profit/loss), SIDEX, mil.USD
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Note: financial data converted at ROL/USD period average exchange rate. 
Source: computed from www.rasd.ro 
 
 
Is SIDEX a model to be replicated? 
 
• First thing to emphasize in the SIDEX case is the specificity of the 
industry. Steel is a commodity, hence steel products15 made in 
Romania are, at least in theory, competing with steel products 
elsewhere. 
From this perspective, the steel industry is comparable to the cement 
industry. Cement is one of the success stories of the privatization 
process in Romania; foreign capital has become predominant in this 
industry since 1998 (following the Lafarge-Romcim deal), and all the 
major five cement producers in Romania are now owned by foreign 
companies. Most privatization deals on this market were the result of 
direct sales, as it was the case for SIDEX as well. On the other hand, 
post-privatization competition in the cement industry proved limited, 
as a former oligopoly industry has changed to a sum of regional 
monopolies (allocation of market shares between competitors).  
 
• Another feature of SIDEX is that it already had a large domestic 
market. SIDEX products, despite alleged low quality, had 
numerous domestic buyers, given their price and accessibility.  
In this respect, SIDEX can be compared to the carmarker Dacia. Dacia 
had a large domestic market, despite alleged low quality of cars. 
Although carmaking is a global industry, the competing products are 
different in terms of quality and brand awareness; the product is not a 
commodity. Renault announced plans for a new car produced at the 
                                                                          
15 There are two main groups of steel products: long products, respectively 
flat. LNM Group has a balanced portfolio of long and flat products. SIDEX 
produces more flat products, that compete with flat products elsewhere. 
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Dacia plant, to be competitive on foreign markets; however, four 
years after privatization, Dacia focus is still on the domestic market. 
Better management techniques were certainly introduced by Renault; 
yet, the results could not had been as spectacular as in the SIDEX 
case. Steel does not need to be re-invented to make it profitable and 
competitive in world markets; cars do sometimes, and Dacia is an 
example. Domestic market is a buffer for Renault’s Dacia, until 
technological upgrading makes the car competitive abroad. 
Such a buffer does not exist, unfortunately, for other bad performing 
industries and firms in Romania. The truckmaker Roman, for example, 
does not have a sufficient domestic market. The turnover/employee 
ratio, as of December 2001, was around 4300 USD, as compared to 
SIDEX pre-restructuring turnover/employee ratio (also on December 
2001), which was 28300 USD. As figure 5 shows, Roman losses almost 
one dollar for each two dollars sold. 
 
Fig.  5. Roman selected financial indicators, mil. USD 
 31.12.1999 30.06.2001 31.12.2001 30.06.2002 
Total 
liabilities 
132.4 49.8 56.3 59.3
Turnover 52.3 16.7 37.9 22.6
Net result -21.2 -8.5 -17.0 -9.9
Note: financial data converted at ROL/USD end period exchange rate (for 
liabilities) and period average rate (for turnover and net result) 
Source: computed from www.rasd.ro 
 
 
Roman has constantly lost domestic market in favour of imported 
trucks. ARO and ROCAR have also constantly lost domestic market in 
favour of imported vehicles, making them unattractive for a potential 
buyer in quest for a competitive product. In their cases, technological 
upgrading is probably more expensive than the cost of greenfield 
investment, not to mention that, in a restructuring, sensitive job cuts 
need to be taken. Good examples in this regard are Landini-Laverda 
in the tractor-making and INA-FAG in roll-bear industry. These two 
foreign investors decided not to buy Tractorul, respectively Rulmentul 
Brasov, but to set up new production facilities (in Buzau, and ironically 
Brasov).  
 
• To replicate SIDEX story for another company, we need not only 
a similar commodity-type of industry and an existing market 
potential for company’s products, but also, and maybe 
foremost, another LNM-type of investor. This is to say a global 
player in the respective industry, aiming at creating competitive 
advantage over global competitors by taking over emerging 
markets. In Romania, LNM obtained a bunch of fiscal facilities, 
debt swaps at discount rates, and a global advantage by 
avoiding US’s surcharge on imported steel.  
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Can another foreign investor obtain similar market power 
inducements? They actually did, but failed in most cases to make a 
more competitive product and to increase overall welfare. OTE-
Romtelecom and Noble Ventures – CS Resita deals are noteworthy. 
Both investors obtained numerous facilities and incentives, but the final 
result was disappointing; CS Resita is now back under state’s 
administration, while OTE scored rising operational losses and was even 
fined by the Competition Council for monopolist behaviour. An 
explanation why these deals proved underperforming might had been 
the fact that these foreign investors had no global reach. They were, 
at the best, regional or niche players; their managerial experience in 
reviving distressed companies was limited, and their international 
network was not sufficiently expanded. Therefore, the incentives and 
facilities obtained in Romania offered them a local competitive 
advantage, but not a global competitive advantage.  
This does not rule out the possibility that companies without a global 
exposure could engage in taking over troublemaking industries or 
firms. Such cases are however the exception rather than the rule, and 
case-by-case explanations can be found. Take the local investor 
MYO-O, who bought Semanatoarea few years ago (after the global 
investor New Holland abandoned acquisition plans) and is now close 
to finalize negotiations for Tractorul Brasov; MYO-O actually used to be 
a dealer for Semanatoarea and Tractorul products and their market 
knowledge lies probably behind their acquisitions.  
 
 
Warnings 
 
• The SIDEX case should not be regarded as a benchmark for 
other large loss-making companies, unless a mix of conditions is 
met: a commodity-type of industry, or at least an industry with 
an appetite for consolidation, an existing demand for 
company’s products, and a global reach investor with focus on 
emerging markets.  
This is not to say that other stories (it is too early yet to call them success 
stories) could not occur; but not necessarily following the SIDEX 
example. 
 
• The improved financial indicators of SIDEX should be treated 
with caution, given the complex web of financial relations within 
such a transnational corporation as the LNM Group. Moreover, 
a precedent has recently been set within the LNM Group 
regarding disinvestment. LNM closed its Irish mills in mid-2001, 
only few years after acquiring them, and few months before 
buying SIDEX. It is worth mentioning that, of all countries with 
LNM operations, Ireland was probably the one with the fastest 
pace of real convergence with the EU, in terms of wage 
  P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T ,  R O M A N I A  
−  M A Y  2 0 0 3  −  
 
 
 
37
differentials and environmental norms. The expected time of 
Romania’s admission in the EU, 2007, coincides with the 
moment LNM’s fiscal incentives at SIDEX come to an end. 
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4.PRESS FREEDOM 
 
 
 
VESTED INTERESTS HAVE NEARLY 
SUBORDINATED ROMANIAN MEDIA 
 
 
There is an obvious trade-off between security and personal 
freedom in human societies, and all modern democracies have 
worked out a compromise solution through trial and error in a 
process that took decades, if not centuries. By and large, the 
Western world has leaned towards personal freedom and created 
strong mechanisms to contain the government and defend the 
private life of its citizens, their freedom of speech or access to 
public information. Law and order agencies have to work under 
the close supervision of the judicial system, following lengthy and 
cumbersome procedures full of checkpoints, and every effort has 
been made to ensure that, whenever an error occurs, this 
happens on the liberty side.  
However, this elaborate arrangement has always been subject to 
revision in the light of new developments. After September 11 the 
balance has tilted back towards security to a certain extent, 
following a genuine concern among the general public. The state 
investigation agencies were given more power to scrutinize 
individuals or „high risk groups”, which means they are more likely 
today than two years ago to peek into private correspondence, 
employment records, personal data or private bank accounts of 
ordinary citizens. Speedy procedures were set up to deal with 
suspicious cases, while the judicial supervision was somehow 
relaxed for the sake of expediency. This has happened not only in 
the USA, but also in continental Europe. 
Our concern here is related to the capacity of the new 
democracies in Eastern Europe, primarily in countries like 
Romania, to cope with this worldwide change of priorities. We 
come from the opposite extreme, getting out a decade ago from 
a system where total social control was the norm and stability the 
supreme value. While Western societies have in-built natural 
mechanisms to supervise and restrain the newly empowered state 
and prevent abuses − strong civil societies, an institutional culture 
What can serve as 
counter-weight to 
the newly 
empowered state 
in the transition 
countries? 
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of accountability in state organizations, an entrenched sense that 
repression, even when necessary, should be applied carefully and 
proportionate to the threat − no such thing exists in our parts. On 
the contrary, the local law and order agencies are by tradition 
unaccountable and abusive. Moreover, their new discretion of 
action is as likely as not to be used indiscriminately, targeting 
both potential wrongdoers and political adversaries of whoever is 
in power (examples below). Many democrats in the CEE countries 
hoped they could use the import of Western laws and institutions, 
backed by the influence of international organizations, precisely 
in order to change the informal practices inherited from the 
ancient regime. At present they are somehow disappointed to 
realize that the current trend is only likely to strengthen the hand 
of hardliners in state agencies − prosecutor offices, investigation 
police, intelligence services.  In our parts many members of such 
institutions have been socialized professionally during the 
Communist times, and some used to work as officers and 
collaborators for the former Securitate apparatus. They have 
suddenly gained an unexpected legitimacy when accepted as 
counterparts by their Western colleagues in the new global fight 
against terrorism.  
To a certain extent, this was unavoidable. However, there are two 
aspects we would like to stress here. First, democracy assistance 
and monitoring has to continue in Romania if the country is to 
ever establish the rule of law. Otherwise dangerous slippages can 
occur. Only in the last twelve months we have seen a flurry of 
restrictive legislation dealing with party registration16, NGO 
registration, the organization of peaceful public meetings and 
protests, tax fraud, the new Criminal Code, surveillance 
procedures, and so on. In some cases the laws are wrong -- for 
example those requiring government approval for registering an 
NGO, or banning some terms from being used by private 
associations in their names (such as “institute”, “academy” or 
“national”). Other are less funny and can have sinister 
consequences, such as the provision of the draft Penal Code that 
punishes with 2 to 5 years in jail the dissemination outside 
Romania of “false and biased news that affect the interests or 
honor of the nation”. Try to recall how many times in the last year 
you happened to be abroad and said something which may 
qualify as biased information about your country – well, if the 
Romanian Ministry of Justice have it their way, you are as many 
times a criminal offender.  
                                                                          
16 See “Freedom of association endangered?”, Early Warning Report 7/2002, 
www.sar.org.ro  
Hardliners relish 
the security-
oriented 
environment and 
their new 
legitimacy with the 
Western partners 
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In all these cases the hardliners in government, Parliament or law 
and order agencies have simply seized the opportunity and 
reinstated measures in accordance to their old philosophy of 
social control. In other instances, such as combating tax fraud or 
classifying sensitive information, the original intention was 
probably understandable, but it was poorly transposed in law and 
hence abuses are not only possible, but quite probable17. In other 
words, policy priorities that are similar to those adopted in 
Western countries are likely to lead to very different effects in an 
environment of weak accountability and incomplete 
democratization. Romania’s Western partners, primarily the EU 
and USA, must keep this in mind when they deal with their local 
counterparts. 
Second, we have to pay more attention to the strengthening of 
those social actors who can act as counterweights and prevent 
state abuse. The public sector has to be made more transparent 
from within, in order to allow outside scrutiny, and proper 
horizontal accountability should be created. Law and order 
(protecting private citizens from private wrongdoers) is not the 
only thing that matters – rule of law (protecting private citizens 
from the state, including law and order agencies) is also 
important. Recently, APADOR-CH (a human rights association) 
has requested from the Office of General Prosecutor the number 
of authorizations of telephone surveillance issued in the last year 
and the number of cases brought to court based on such 
evidence. The Office refused, the association sued on FOIA and 
won in the first instance, but as the case moved forward after 
appeal, the Prosecutor made some public statements that can 
be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate judges who dare to 
rule against him. Such cases are likely to become more frequent 
in the new security-oriented environment, as we have seen last 
year when the prefect of Iaşi had to resign following suspicions 
that he knew about illegal telephone surveillance of 
conversations between local journalists and the EU ambassador. 
In other cases public officials took to harrasing journalists who 
insist on uncovering unpleasant stories, and judicial instruments 
proved to be very effective in this respect. Whether they are 
prosecutors, police officers, tax inspectors or intelligence agents, 
these overzealous individuals do a deservice to the government, 
and even the cabinet members have admitted this in some 
occasions. Most abuses are probably committed without central 
                                                                          
17 In fact the laws are so sloppily written that many analysts believe this is done 
so on purpose, in order to give state agencies a free hand. For example, the 
proposed tax fraud law practically abolishes the privacy of personal bank 
transactions and creates an open list of agencies that can investigate such 
matters, under very weak or no court control.  
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coordination, in anticipation that this is what is expected from 
them. The government would be well-advised to distance 
themselves from such institutional fedayeens. Strong political 
signals that such behavior is unacceptable – such as punishing 
the most blatant abuses, and abandoning dangerous draft laws – 
would improve very much the image and credibility of the 
government.  
The role of the media, both written and electronic, is crucial for 
achieving the right balance between freedom and security in a 
society. It is the main vehicle for expressing alternative views, 
criticisms and discussing policies. In spite of frequent accusations 
of bias and control, the media looks pretty solid and independent 
in most of the Western countries − which cannot be said about 
their colleagues in Romania. In the last years we have seen a 
decline in its quality and independence, particularly as far as TV 
stations and local newspapers are concerned. The political and 
economic pressure on journalists and management has been 
tremendous, and the public watched with disappointment how 
quickly some of them fell into line. The remainder of this section 
explores the state of mass-media in Romania today; future issues 
of EWR will continue the Rule of Law warnings with subjects such 
as personal data and privacy protection, corruption and 
transparency&accountability (the last topic based mostly on our 
assessments of how FOIA and the Sunshine laws are 
implemented).  
Regress concerning freedom of speech 
 
The annual report concerning freedom of speech elaborated by the 
Agency for Press Monitoring starts with the sharp assertion: ”During the 
two years of the PSD ruling we can see a noticeable regress when it 
comes to freedom of speech.” The Southeast European Media 
Organization (SEEMO) ranked Romania second in the region with 
regards to the number of cases of violation of press freedom. These 
cases included verbal threats and physical attacks; criminal or civil 
suits; conflicts with criminals, the military, police, secret services or 
governmental officials; problems with border authorities or with 
obtaining visas; disputes between media owners and editors and 
reporters and political pressures. In this ranking Romania is second after 
Serbia. Even countries like Bosnia, Macedonia and Moldova have had 
a smaller number of such incidents than Romania (see Fig.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Government 
should distance 
itself from the 
fedayeens who 
commit abuses in 
law and order 
institutions 
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Fig. 1. Number of press freedom violations (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Southeast European Media Organization (SEEMO) 
 
 
Romania is the only candidate for the accession to the EU lying in 
the category of countries with partially free press in the Freedom 
House ranking (see Fig. 2). The current government has made 
significant economic progress, has maintained economic growth 
and has reduced inflation, however it failed at relaxing the 
legislation regarding freedom of speech and, in general, at 
indicators concerning democratic progress. With regard to these 
indicators Romania ranks constantly among countries like 
Moldova, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Bosnia. Can a country that is 
invited to join NATO, and which is negotiating the accession to 
the EU, afford to be seen in such company? 
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Fig. 2. Press freedom in former communist countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: F = Free Press; PF = Partly Free Press; Not Free Press = NF 
Rating: free press 0 – 30, partly free press 31 – 60, not free press 61 – 90. 
Source: The annual survey of press freedom, Freedom House, 2002 
 
A legislation surprisingly resilient 
 
Ever since 1997, Resolution 1123 of the European Council noted 
rather harshly that ”certain provisions of the Penal Code now in 
force are unacceptable and seriously imperil the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms, especially Article 200 on homosexual acts 
and Articles 205, 206, 238 and 239 relating to insult and 
defamation, which interfere with the freedom of the press.” Even 
though six years have passed since then, the Romanian 
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governments of various political orientations have not resolved 
this problem. Ironically, the issue of incrimination of homosexuality 
has been resolved, even though there has been strong 
opposition, including the one from the Romanian Orthodox 
Church, but the press problem has not been resolved, despite the 
fact that everyone is in principle in favor of freedom of speech. 
In all these official or non-governmental rankings, Romania loses 
points because of the legislation restricting freedom of speech. 
Legislative provisions such as the article from the Penal Code 
punishing the spreading of false information that could harm 
Romanian interests seem to be anachronic remains of the 
communist right that democratic governments did not want to 
give up out of a mental inertia which is hard to understand. And 
still the article mentioned above was used as a pretext in the 
case of Armageddon II, when a person was arrested and another 
one cross-examined for having posted on the Internet information 
accusing the head of the government of corruption. The way the 
authorities dealing with the investigation have acted, their 
servilism and the unjustified media fuss reminded Romanians of 
pretty recent times. And such legislative anachronisms can be 
activated anytime if political interests dictate it. The Office of 
General Prosecutor maintained that spreading that information 
has damaged the Romanian image abroad, which is quite a 
debatable assertion. What’s for sure is that the whole 
”Armageddon II” scandal has damaged the Romanian image 
abroad much more: it made it look like a country where a 
fundamental freedom can be arbitrarily violated, a country in 
which freedom is uncertain. It’s been a year since the event and 
the case mentioned above has not been definitively closed yet; 
the state attorneys and policemen who showed a political 
servilism and false zeal in doing their job we could hardly imagine 
after more than ten years since the 1989 moment have been 
punished just by changes in positions which seem more like 
promotions. 
It is clear that legislation does not make Romania a secure 
country for journalists. In 2001 a delegation of the Romanian 
Parliament to the Council of Europe declared that insult and 
calumny are no longer incriminated by local legislation. However, 
APADOR–CH pointed out that it was simply a lie, thus putting the 
government in a delicate position. The disincrimination of 
defamation, calumny and insult is a long complicated story with 
embarrassing moments and intentional delays from which one 
can only infer the lack of political will from the part of those in 
power. The government emitted in 2002 an emergency ordinance 
that solves the problem only partially: it annuls jail sentence for 
insult, diminishes the sentence for calumny but creates a new 
discrimination between dignitaries and simple citizens by adding 
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new penalties for offenses against the former. Although the 
government had the chance to change something, it preferred 
to do nothing about the essence of the problem: jail sentence for 
journalists. Moreover, when it came to be discussed in the 
Parliament, the members of the party in power joined the right 
extremists from the Romania Mare Party in order to make the 
sanctions in this ordinance even harsher. President Iliescu rejected 
this ordinance asking for the annulment of jail sentence for 
calumny. 
The new project of the Penal Code that the government submitted for 
public debate at the beginning of 2003 does nothing but reiterates 
these mistakes. Jail sentence changes into the so-called fine-days, a 
legal artifice that changes jail into money. The amount of these fines is 
huge for journalists, as most of them earn less than the average wages 
on the economy ($130), not to mention journalists from local 
publications. What is even more absurd is that these fines can be given 
even if the journalist proves not guilty or shows good faith, in case a 
person feels offended or defamed. This interpretation that the law 
allows is not just a theoretical possibility- there have already been 
cases in which the court acted on it. Moreover, the new Penal Code 
punishes country defamation, the spreading of any “biased” 
information and defines treason in a very ambiguous way. In short, in 
2003 the government puts forward a penal code that is already dated 
and that does nothing but continues the legislation against freedom of 
speech. The last report of the Council of Europe (14 January 2003, 
Committee on Culture, Science and Education) made a note of these 
missed opportunities: “While the trend to improving the situation can 
be welcomed; it is regrettable that the proposed reform falls short of 
Council of Europe standards. To follow them, it would be highly 
suitable that the Romanian Parliament remove altogether libel, insult 
and calumny from the Penal Code.”  
 
The Armageddon case itself presented above can offer an answer to 
the question: why do the Romanian governments (current and 
previous ones) refuse to liberalize the legislation regarding freedom of 
speech? Why such stubbornness? Although the Romanian 
government usually proves to be very receptive to the messages of 
the European Commission, it ignored the recommendation in the last 
country review to give up restrictive legislation. Why so? Because the 
Romanian politicians want to possess an efficient instrument to 
intimidate the press- this is the only conclusion that the organizations 
for protecting journalists could come up with. On the other hand, the 
government put forward a Law on Classified Information under the 
pretext that it was a requirement for the accession to NATO. This law 
that was adopted by the Parliament in April 2002 was considered to 
be too restrictive by the civil society. The definition of classified 
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information is too vague and the list of those who can classify 
information is too long. Practically, any dignitary or government official 
can classify office information without any further checkings. 
 
By means of the new Law on Broadcasting (504/2002) the National 
Council of Broadcasting- CAN – can lift the license of TV channels 
without any provisional sanctions. The CNA members are appointed 
by the Presidency and Parliament, therefore they can be influenced 
politically. There has already been a first controversial case in which 
CNA lifted the broadcasting license of a TV channel. OTV was a TV 
channel specialized in scandals, aired low quality programs, had no 
clear revenue sources, and did not follow any ethical standards with 
regard to journalism. In September 2002, the leader of the extremist 
Romania Mare Party, senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor, was invited in a 
live talk-show where he expressed racist opinions regarding the 
Romano and the Jewish and foul attacks against his political 
adversaries, including the government. CNA lifted the license of the 
channel on the basis of article 40 of the new law that bans all 
programs with a content urging to racial or ethnic hatred. Even though 
the decision seems correct and in accordance with the new law, the 
way it was implemented and communicated raised question marks. 
The Ministry of Communications ordered immediately that the cable 
firms interrupt the broadcasting of the channel and they complied 
with it. CNA did not communicate the decision immediately and 
motivated it only later, giving the impression of an impromptu act, 
especially since president Iliescu had previously asked for the checking 
of the channel. The public reaction was weak and most newspapers 
approved of the decision, as OTV had a terrible reputation among 
journalists. Anyway, the legal power of the CNA to rapidly lift a license 
as well as this unhappy case of shutting down a TV channel mean no 
progress, on the contrary. 
 
As the table below shows (see Fig.3), Romania follows the general 
tendency of the other states in the region: restrictive regulations that 
the governments keep as spare measures for putting pressure on the 
press, promises of liberalizing the legislation made under Western 
pressure, only seldom put into practice, and a faulty mentality of 
politicians perceiving journalists as their potential enemies. However, 
Romania is a country that set up the year  2007 as  target for its 
accession to the UE and cannot afford to be constantly compared 
with states that have just gotten out of war or are in severe social, 
political or ethnical crises. Unfortunately, the comparison is not only 
possible, but also relevant. For example, the comparative table shows 
Romania as being a country with the highest number of prosecutions 
in the region. This issue risks becoming even more pressing as Article 19, 
a large organization that deals with the protection of freedom of 
speech, carries on a campaign for including some very strict criteria of 
protecting freedom of speech for the accession to NATO and UE. If this 
idea materializes, Romania could find itself in serious trouble.   
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Recommendations: 
• The punitive legislation in the domain of press has disastrous 
effects on the Romanian image worldwide. Since the 
current government is extremely sensitive to this aspect, it 
should eliminate completely the jail sentence for press 
offenses and the fines should be within reasonable limits 
and applicable only under very special circumstances. 
• The new Penal Code that is still at the stage of public 
debate has to be updated and adapted to the modern 
principle according to which individual rights must be 
protected before vague and debatable collective entities. 
Freedom of speech is more precious than an illusory 
“national pride” that the initial project wants to protect by 
resorting to excessive means. The signal given out by the 
government is already extremely negative.       
• The adoption of the Freedom of Information Act was a 
salutary step forward. The law positively discriminates the 
press in a special section but needs a better 
implementation policy. With few exceptions, the journalists 
have not realized the advantages they can enjoy by 
means of this law, therefore there is a need for special 
training courses. Editors and employers’ press organizations 
should teach their employees to benefit from the new 
opportunities. 
• Many of the trials in which journalists are convicted show 
that Romanian courts do not know about the decision of 
the European Court in Strasbourg, based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Having been signed by 
Romania ever since 1994, this became part of domestic 
right. Although there is a first case that was won in 1998, 
Dalban versus Romania, journalists keep being convicted 
on the basis of domestic laws that are clashing with the 
Convention. The Ministry of Justice should hold training 
courses for judges based on European judicial precedents 
in order to avoid the situation that happened before, when 
Romania had to pay damages. 
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Fig. 3. Comparative table for SEE, November 2002 
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complaints 
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there is a mixed 
body to oversee 
it. In practice 
however, PBS is 
seen by public 
as strongly 
influenced by 
the 
government.  
Formally yes, 
but without real 
authority to 
address – for 
instance - the 
problems of 
piracy. 
Yes, adopted in 
November 2000. 
Still very difficult 
to obtain 
information. 
Ministries bluntly 
refuse 
requested 
public 
information. 
Defamation is in 
penal code, 
prison sentences 
possible, courts 
presume bad 
faith and fines/ 
damages are 
disproportionate
. 
Bosnia – 
Herzegovina 
 
Yes. Clear 
criteria, fair 
and 
competitive 
procedure 
and 
possibility for 
appeal. 
 
Formally yes, 
rules should 
safeguard 
independence 
but still to be 
proven in 
practice. 
 
  
Yes, the 
Communication
s Regulatory 
Agency (CRA) is 
an independent 
state body, 
financed from 
the license fees. 
  
Yes, laws 
adopted but 
low level of 
public 
awareness and 
very limited 
implementation. 
High Rep 
decriminalized 
defamation. 
New 
defamation law 
drafted by 
mixed group of 
international 
and local 
experts. 
Adopted by RS, 
but not 
Federation BiH.  
Bulgaria 
 
Lack of 
transparency 
and some 
shortcomings 
in the law 
lead to 
heavy 
criticism. Also 
lack of 
criteria and 
no action 
against 
pirate 
channels. 
Review 
underway. 
Formally yes, 
but 
management 
and key 
editorial staff 
changes 
regularly. 
Unstable. 
Members / rules 
change with 
each 
government.  
 
Yes. Adopted in 
2000. Getting 
information not 
easy, but courts 
obliged 
authorities to 
release info in 
several cases 
and public 
officials get 
training. 
Defamation is in 
penal code (no 
imprisonment) 
and fines are 
high. However, 
positive 
modifications in 
2000 and 
Supreme Court 
has ruled in 
favor of 
journalists. 
Croatia 
 
 
Formally yes, 
but 
complaints 
about 
criteria and 
slow/inefficie
nt voting 
procedure.  
Formally yes, 
but critics say 
influence of the 
authorities is 
tangible and 
PBS receives 
preferential 
treatment. 
 Yes. No, although 
there are some 
provisions in 
general law. 
Authorities not 
responsive to 
such requests, 
though. 
Defamation is 
out of penal 
code, but the 
damages under 
civil code are 
high and still 
arbitrary.  
Hundreds of civil 
cases pending 
due to slow 
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judiciary. 
FYR 
Macedonia 
No. Process is 
not 
transparent, 
does not 
appear fair, 
there is a 
lack of clear 
criteria and 
outcome 
seems 
politically 
motivated. 
No. 
Appointment of 
key 
management is 
political, done 
by parliament 
and changes 
elections. MRTV 
is viewed as 
government 
mouthpiece. No 
real editorial 
independence.  
No, the 
Broadcasting 
Council can 
only 
recommend 
and its 
independence 
is considered 
declarative at 
most by critics. 
No.  NGO’s 
have started 
preliminary work 
on draft law 
has. 
Defamation in 
penal code, but 
very few cases 
partly due to 
slow judiciary. 
 
Moldova 
 
Formally yes, 
the 
Audiovisual 
law has 
criteria on 
which the 
Council 
decides. 
However, 
many 
complaints 
about 
objectivity, 
fairness and 
transparency 
after licenses 
were 
granted.  
No, 
governmental 
influence 
caused major 
crisis leading to 
recently 
adopted law on 
transformation 
of PBS. Experts 
are pessimistic 
about possible 
improvement, 
though. 
Formally yes, 
but members of 
Broadcasting 
Coordination 
Council appear 
rather close to 
those that 
nominated 
them 
(parliament, 
president, 
government). 
Yes. Law 
adopted in May 
2000 but 
nothing is done 
to implement it. 
Ministries 
reluctant to 
provide 
information.  
Defamation in 
penal code, but 
not used. 
Hundreds of civil 
cases though, 
as public 
officials are 
more protected 
and burden of 
proof lies with 
media. 
 
Montenegro No, the 
process is not 
transparent, 
and 
considered 
unfair due to 
lack of 
criteria and 
openness. 
New 
legislation 
should 
improve this, 
yet 
implementati
on is 
postponed. 
No, the state 
broadcaster 
hasn’t been 
transformed into 
genuine PBS 
and editorial 
policy is seen as 
heavily 
influenced by 
government 
and 
parliamentary 
majority. 
No. New laws 
foresee the 
establishment of 
an independent 
body, but 
implementation 
is suspended 
until next year. 
No. NGO’s are 
working on draft 
law. 
Defamation is in 
penal code, 
prison sentences 
possible though 
not applied, 
public officials 
are protected 
and fines are 
very high. 
Romania 
 
 
Yes, in 
theory, but 
many serious 
complaints 
about 
transparency 
Editorial 
independence 
is formally 
guaranteed by 
law, but 
management 
Yes. Yes, adopted in 
2001. No real 
implementation 
and public 
awareness, 
though. 
Insult and libel in 
penal code, 
burden of proof 
with media, 
disproportionate 
fines, 400 cases 
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and fairness. 
Council does 
not publicly 
motivate 
decisions. 
Under new 
law (2002), 
two bodies 
oversee 
licensing/ 
frequencies. 
changes 
regularly; 
parliament can 
force new 
board if, as it 
did, rejects the 
annual report. 
 
 per year. 
Recently 
government 
initiated 
amendment to 
lower fines. 
 
Serbia No, a 
moratorium 
exists since 
the end of 
2000. With 
the new 
broadcasting 
law adopted 
(June 2002), 
a regulatory 
body has to 
be formed, 
frequency 
plan made 
and 
subsequently 
new licenses 
/ frequencies 
can be 
allocated. 
Formally RTS is 
still state 
controlled, but 
political 
influence 
appears limited 
and 
transformation 
process towards 
public institution 
is ongoing. 
 
 
To be formed by 
the end of 
October 2002, 
but so far 
nomination of 
members stalled 
in parliament. 
Statutes to be 
adopted. 
 
No. A law is in 
preparation and 
should be 
submitted to the 
parliament.   
Defamation is in 
penal code, 
journalists are 
regularly sued. 
 
Source: Yasha Lange, Media Task Force, Stability Pact for SEE 
 
A poor, hence vulnerable press 
The media is not a very profitable business in Romania. The 
majority of press institutions are in a precarious economic 
situation. That is why the press is extremely vulnerable to 
economic pressures. These pressures manifest themselves both at 
the (1) journalist level; and (2) employer level. 
1. The journalist –when compromise becomes desirable 
The average salary in Romania is the lowest among the countries 
that are candidates for the accession to the UE, and the average 
salary of journalists is lower than national average. Cases in which 
journalists receive ”a second salary” from some political parties or 
institutions have become more frequent especially over the last 
years. These cases are known among the press people, but 
neither other journalists, nor professional organizations are 
outraged by this situation. There exist hilarious cases, such as the 
one in Timişoara, where five journalists became also employees of 
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the County Council. At a focus-group meeting organized by the 
Center for Independent Journalism (CIJ), a journalist said: ”The 
worst thing is that such practices start to be considered as being 
normal, even desirable.” CIJ estimates there are about 14.000 
journalists in Romania, even though official statistics show a 
maximum of 8.000. The difference between the figures comes 
from the practice of replacing permanent labor contracts with 
the so-called collaboration contracts, a form of employment that 
does not protect the employee from the abuses of the employers. 
There are many professional organizations, but very few of these 
are really active and give any assistance to journalists. The largest 
organization, the Romanian Press Club (RPC) is a strange hybrid in 
which both media employers and employees are represented. 
RPC is efficient when negotiating advantages for the media 
industry with the government, but it cannot provide simple 
journalists with an efficient protection particularly because of its 
structure. 
Fig. 4. Advertising costs (Euro per capita - 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ARBOmedia 
2. When only money talks 
A lot of newspapers, although not very efficient, are owned by 
thriving business people only with the intention to follow a 
different type of interests. In general, the ownership in media is 
rather obscure and the press is used as an instrument to 
accomplish other goals of the group that controls it (pressure on 
private partners, rent-seeking, etc). Very few publications were 
taken over by foreign media trusts (Evenimentul Zilei, Libertatea), 
238
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as these also have the greatest number of readers. The tragic 
demise of the manager of the most influential daily paper 
(Adevărul) raised a lot of questions about the way he had taken 
over the majority of shares just a few months before his death. 
There are persistent speculations about some politicians that 
could be behind these shares. In very many editing offices there 
are taboo topics that journalists respect. These topics regard 
financial interests of the owners as well as political interests that 
could prove “helpful”. It is pretty difficult to develop autonomous 
press businesses, since the press market is extremely limited and 
already overcrowded.   
Not even foreign ownership can be a guarantee of editorial 
independence. Recently the whole news team of Europa FM – 
one of the most popular FM radio stations across the country, 
especially in large cities – has resigned blaming pressures to 
supress unpleasant news and ban certain political commentators. 
The owner of Europa FM is the French industrial group Lagardere, 
which is believed to have plans to expand its operations in 
Romania. Apparently, losing audience better for business than 
news that may annoy authorities.  
Advertising doesn’t manage to provide half of the publications’ 
revenues, which have to rely on sales, and this is what renders 
them rather unstable from the economic point of view. Although 
the market is pretty small, some players find ways to cheat. 
Another scandal in 2002 centered around the way in which some 
newspapers tried to get advertising from large companies by 
threatening with the launching of some negative media 
campaigns. The weekly Academia Caţavencu accused Ziua for 
having used this method. The same Ziua benefited in a strange 
way from massive advertising appearances from the part of some 
state companies, all of them being subordinated to the Ministry of 
Transports (National Railroad Company, Roads Administration, 
International Otopeni Administration, Constanţa Harbor 
Administration). However, the market has had a tendency of self-
regulating after the coming out of the National Study of 
Audience, that allows the buyers of advertising space to be 
guided by the number of readers. This way, the hierarchy of the 
revenues from advertising changed considerably between 2000 
and 2002, and newspapers with a lot of readers, such as 
Libertatea and Evenimentul Zilei, benefited from this 
profesionalization.        
TV channels don’t seem to be doing better. As a result of 
developing a professional system of ratings, the method of 
allocating advertising space (pay per audience index) changed 
too. This change was detrimental to TV channels, which 
overevaluated their prices for advertising. These prices decreased 
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dramatically from $2-3000 per minute to a few hundreds. Thus, TV 
channels had to increase the number of advertising spots by 
approximately 30% from 2000 until 2002 (Alfacont data). These 
circumstances made TV channels even more vulnerable to 
political pressures. The obscure relationships between TV 
channels’ employers and the government raised a lot of 
suspicions. The political vulnerability increased from the moment 
the management of audio-visual press groups gave in to the 
temptation of fast gains and started to delay the payment of 
taxes and social contributions related to salaries, this way 
accumulating arrears over time that are difficult to pay at 
present.     
Fig. 5. Number of advertising spots in main TV channels 
(thousands)  
 Pro-TV  Antena 1 Prima-TV 
2000 65 70 60 
2001 80 69 68 
2002 (just first 9 
months) 
93 90 93 
Source: Alfacont 
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Media Pro International, which owns the broadcasting license for the largest private 
channel in the country, Pro TV, has accumulated debts to the state budget of nearly 1.4 
trillion lei [$40 million], as sources from the Ministry of Finance indicate. In October 
2001, Gheorghe Oana, secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance, publicly 
acknowledged that Pro TV's owner had debts to the state, but wouldn't specify the 
amount. The disclosure prompted the American Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to open an investigation into the debts of Media Pro International, where U.S. 
billionaire Ronald Lauder's Central European Media Enterprises (CME) holds a 66 
percent stake. A source close to the company's management says that Media Pro 
International struck a deal with Nastase's ruling PSD − an exchange of positive 
coverage for winking at the channel's debts. Partly owned by SBS Broadcasting, TV 
Prima is in a similar situation. At the beginning of 2000, Amerom SRL, the owner of TV 
Prima's broadcasting license, had debts of $29.7 million to the Banking Claims 
Resolution Agency (AVAB). In the first quarter of that year the channel posted revenues 
of only $704,000, and spent nearly $2 million. SBS announced that it would freeze its 
investments into the channel in the next three years. Moreover, the company has sold 
53.5 percent of its shares in the channel to an undisclosed company owned by TV 
Prima's head, Cristian Burci. Trying to save Burci − widely held to be a political ally of 
the PSD − the government pumped some $5.9 million from public coffers into the 
pockets of TV Prima's boss to keep the channel afloat. The shady deal was leaked out 
in April 2002 when the opposition Democratic Party presented documents to the 
parliament proving that companies owned by the Ministry of Transportation transferred 
cash to Global Media, where Burci holds a majority stake. Reports on the TV Prima saga 
have progressively disappeared from the press. The second largest TV channel, Antena 
1, has always been known as the mouthpiece of the former communists, dressed in 
social democratic garb after the 1989 revolution. "Nastase's spokesperson calls the 
news editors and tells them what piece of news about government must be broadcast 
and when," a source from Antena 1's editorial staff says. Dan Voiculescu, head of 
Antena 1's owner (the Grivco Group) is also president of the Romanian Humanist Party 
(PUR), a member of the ruling coalition. The Romanian public television, TVR, which 
gathers a 13% audience on its first channel, Romania 1, has always been highly 
politicized. The parliament appoints its council. Initially, there were high hopes for the 
parliament-controlled National Audiovisual Council, which was tasked with charting 
freedom of expression. But so far, as media observers point out, the council has 
miserably failed in objectively assessing the pressures exerted on TV channels. 
“Transition online 
June 2002” 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
18 Source: Transitions Online, June 2002 
 
    SWEET COVERAGE FOR DEBT BLINDNESS18 
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Local press – an easy prey 
Local papers altogether have more readers than central ones. At the 
same time, the market is very fragmented, the number of potential 
readers is smaller, therefore the local press is a more tempting and easier 
prey to political circles. After the PDSR  (current PSD) won the elections in 
2000, a real campaign was launched by means of which business people 
close to the party bought local papers. The best example is the case of 
Monitorul network, which used to manage publications in the most 
important cities in the country. The Capital magazine did a survey and 
came to the conclusion that, after a series of financial transactions, many 
of the publications from this network were taken over by business people 
that were open supporters of the PSD (Piatra Neamţ, Brăila, Roman, 
Bucureşti). According to the same source, in each district there are 
publications that are close to the ruling party, quasi-official papers, and in 
places where this is lacking there are pressures for buying key publications. 
 
In some cases, journalists from the former Monitorul network laid 
the foundation of some independent newspapers starting from 
scratch. When the editors of the former Monitorul de Vrancea 
(Vrancea is a district in Moldova) founded Ziarul de Vrancea 
local authorities started a campaign to intimidate them that 
included everything from persistent audits and controls from the 
part of firemen to the hiring of some bullies that hunted down 
paper sellers. Although there was a court order in favor of the 
editorial staff, the authorities closed down all the stands the 
paper was using (the distribution network RODIPET, a state 
property, refused to distribute it). They also banned the access of 
accredited journalists representing public institutions, this way 
violating the Freedom Access of Information Act. Several local 
institutions sued the paper, generating a total of 135 trials for 
which damages worth 400.000 Euro are claimed. The central 
leadership of the party did not make any efforts to stop this 
campaign led by the local leader of the PSD, Marian Oprişan, 
although not long ago the PSD elaborated some well-meaning 
guidelines to regulate the relationships with the press. Vrancea is 
not the only district with problems. On the contrary, in many 
districts there appeared the so called “local barons”, who are 
local leaders of the PSD, are holding all the administrative levers 
in the districts and react violently, verbally and even physically, 
against the few critical opinions.  
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Fewer voices 
The report of the World Association of Newspapers from 
November 2002 notes the fact that in Poland, Moldova, 
Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Romania there are “tendencies 
toward stronger state control”. Romanian analysts agree that the 
media presence of the ruling party is abnormally frequent. Prime 
minister Năstase is undoubtedly the star of the news journals, as 
many evenings he appears even in 4-5 pieces of news. 
Fig. 6. Political leaders on main five TV channels (main news 
journals) 
91
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S
Source: Media Monitoring Agency – Academia Caţavencu, for 
26.09.2002 – 9.10.2002 period. 
The disproportion between the power and the opposition is 
overwhelming. Moreover, as the Media Monitoring Agency shows, 
TV news journals have become less conflictory and focus more 
often on news in brief. TV news journals in Romania have become 
some sort of review of rapes, crimes and traffic accidents. 
Although editors think they can keep their ratings high this way, 
news journals are less watched, losing almost 20% of the audience 
they had in 2000. Therefore the main reason for this situation is not 
the audience, as they always claim- studies show that the 
potential gains generated by insisting on “petty” scandals are 
actually limited- but their attempt to avoid politically sensitive 
topics, plus the lack of professionalism from the part of media 
people and the slightly higher costs of some news and quality 
analysis programs. 
One of the members of the National Audiovisual Council 
(appointed by the ex- president Emil Constantinescu) used the 
  P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T ,  R O M A N I A  
−  M A Y  2 0 0 3  −  
 
 
 
57
French model to propose that the institution should force TV 
channels to allocate 30% of their news time for representing the 
opposition.  Although this proposal was made in good faith, it was 
considered an unacceptable arbitrary intervention from the part 
of the state, and the very fact that such an idea was put forward 
reflects the seriousness of the situation. The proposal became a 
simple recommendation, without imposing anything on TV 
channels and nothing changed. 
The situation of TV news journals is not an exception. Public 
debate in Romania has to suffer because of the clear domination 
of the PSD. The fact that the mayor of Bucharest, Traian Băsescu, 
came into conflict with the PSD administration has made him a 
favorite target of TV programs that either attack him on different 
topics or broadcast in excess the attacks from the part of his 
adversaries. Public television and radio have become servile even 
by Romanian standards, which accept by “tradition” a certain 
tendency of the public press to serve the power. The parliament 
changed the Council of Administration of the Public Radio 
abusively in 2002, abolishing the idea of a system of check and 
balances that would have ensured a certain independence 
towards the newly-established power. There have also been a lot 
of pressures to change the Council of Administration of the Public 
Television, but this action was eventually hindered. The official 
press agency, Rompres, was placed at the orders of the Ministry 
of Public Information in 2001, and journalists became public 
employees. At the initiative of the National Liberal Party, Rompres 
was allowed to become an autonomous institution controlled by 
the Parliament. 
 
Recommendations: 
• The leaders of the PSD should use all their political influence to 
prevent the recalcitrant local leaders from committing 
primitive abuses against the press. As the current power is pro-
West, these attacks against freedom of speech become 
attacks against the image of Romania, which risks 
compromising its efforts of getting out of the gray zone of 
democracy. 
• The government expressed its intention to adopt an 
emergency ordinance on access to information regarding the 
debts owed to the state budget. Implementing this act with 
regard to press trusts, establishing clear and transparent terms 
for debt redemption, which would exclude hidden 
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“arrangements”, would dispel the doubts about the 
blackmailing of debtors. 
• The overwhelming presence of the ruling party on TV channels 
risks being disadvantageous to it in the long run. The public is 
used to hearing the opinions of the prime minister on almost 
any topic and thus it will direct its dissatisfaction exclusively 
towards him. This is a risky bet19.  
• Because of the abusive replacements and transparent 
pressures, the credibility of the public television and radio has 
received severe blows. Being recognized as quasi-official 
sources, they are no longer efficient with regard to what their 
major objective should be: informing citizens on matters of 
public interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
19 As shown by the recent example of the government involvement in the 
matter of regrowing the turf on the national stadium for the important soccer 
game with Denmark. This investment proved to be a total failure and the 
government and the prime minister are paying now in political capital for the 
gratuitous involvement in a trivial matter they shouldn’t have had anything to 
do with.  
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